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Abstract 
  The Chinese stock market has been segmented into those for domestic and foreign investors 
under its market oriented economic reform process. This paper examines what promotes the 
former A-share public firms to go initial public offerings in the latter B-share market. Following 
implications are derived from the empirical analyzes. First, an A-share firm’s profitability 
positively influences the probability of the IPO in the B-share market, but reverses after 
additional issuances are made. Second, in addition, an A-share firm’s IPO in the B-share market 
consequently relaxed the bank borrowing constraint in the post-IPO period. Third, an A-share 
firm with high growth opportunity is apt to go IPO in the B-share market. Fourth, size of the A-
share firm is positively related to both the probability of IPO and the number of capital stock 
issued in the B-share market.  
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1. Introduction 
  It is commonly known that there are three stock markets in People’s Republic of China, i.e., 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges respectively have two equity markets, i.e., the A-share market which only allows the 
participation of domestic investors, and the B-share market which only permits foreign 
investors1. It is considered that this unique bilateral system has not only prevented the rapid 
increase of foreign capital inflows through the equity market, but also imposed a substantial 
OIKONOMIKA Vol.45 No.3・4，2009，pp.23-35 
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  1 Since February 2001, Chinese Stock Regulatory Commission permitted domestic investors to join the B-share
market and allowed only qualified foreign investors to take part in the A-share market since December 2002.
However, until now, the principal players in the A-share market are still domestic, and foreign in the B-share
market. 
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administrative burden to domestic firms. This paper focuses on what promotes an A-share firm 
to go initial public offering (hereafter IPO) and increase the capital stock issued in the B-share 
market. 
  There are many previous studies on the determinants of IPOs in the developed countries as 
represented by Pagano et al. (1998) and Maksimovic and Pichler (2001). However, this paper 
addresses the uniqueness of the Chinese primary stock market, i.e., a firm goes IPO in the 
segmented stock market under transitional process from the centrally planned to the market 
oriented economy. The following hypotheses are empirically verified in this study. First, from a 
viewpoint of information costs, is an A-share firm’s profitability or the internal funding ability 
influences the B-share IPO decision even in the transitional segmented market. Second, under 
the remaining strict bank borrowing regulations and serious non-performing loan (NPL) 
problems increased in the progress of the market economy, is an A-share firm with serious 
borrowing constraints has incentives to go IPO in the B-share market. Third is that a firm that 
has better growth opportunity or higher stock price in one market also has incentives to go IPO 
in another segmented market. Fourth is that the firm size influences the decision to go IPO in 
the B-share market. 
  The empirical results indicate that an A-share firm’s profitability, a proxy variable for a 
firm’s internal funding ability, is positively related to the decision to go IPO, but shows a 
negative relationship with the number of capital stock issued in the B-share market. Second, a 
firm’s borrowing constraint is relaxed once the firm issued B-stocks. As a result, debt to equity 
ratio of B-share firms is averagely higher than that of A-share firms. Third, a firm with higher 
stock price in the A-share stock market and higher growth opportunity as a result is apt to go 
IPO in the B-share market. Fourth, a large A-share firm prefers to go IPO under an assumption 
that large firms have less asymmetric information problems in addition to those large firms were 
positioned as economic engines in the history of the Chinese national development policy.  
 
2. Testing Hypotheses of the IPO in the B-share Market 
  As of August 2006, the market capitalization of the A-share and B-share markets both in 
Shanghai and Shenzen totals 4.9 trillion RMB (613 billion USD) and 90.0 billion RMB (11.3 
billion USD), respectively. In addition to these two markets, participation in the Hong Kong H-
share market is possible for main land Chinese firms. Requirements of the B-share issuance is 
that, in addition to the conditions for the issuance of A-shares, a firm must have a stable and 
relatively adequate source of foreign exchange reserves since the firm must pay annual 
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dividends abroad in foreign currency after the payment of taxes. 
  The Chinese State Council issued 28 clauses of national rules concerning equity issuance in 
early 1996. All issuances of B-shares must be approved by the People's Bank of China (PBC) 
under its terms. In addition, state owned enterprises that wish to issue B-shares must obtain an 
approval of the State Council Securities Policy Committee. Among these supervisors, the PBC 
is a principal of B-share issuances because, with the denomination of trading of B-shares in the 
Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges being US dollar and HK dollar, respectively, issuing 
companies must open a foreign exchange account at a commercial bank authorized to deal in 
foreign currencies.  
  According to Pagano et. al (1998), following advantages and disadvantages of IPOs are 
pointed out focusing on Italian firms. Advantages of an IPO are overcoming financing 
constraints, strengthening bargaining power in lending rate negotiations with banks, 
diversification of corporate shareholders, enhancement of managerial discipline, and recognition 
of investors, while disadvantages are financial cost of listing procedures and a loss of business 
privacy. This paper reorganizes hypotheses of these reflecting the Chinese stock market 
uniqueness.  
  Our first hypothesis is that the Chinese firm utilizes funds generated from internal sources 
prior to funds generated from external sources because of its low information cost even under 
transitional centrally planned economy. In this hypothesis, we assume corporate insiders and 
foreign investors have large asymmetric information and this causes firms with smaller internal 
funds to be more aggressive in going IPO in the B-share market, regardless of the decision is 
influenced by the Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Council or other related 
government agencies. 
  The second hypothesis is that the borrowing constraint forces the Chinese A-share firms to 
go to the B-share market. This paper assumes the causality of these two variables is very 
remarkable in China. The reason is that as a result of a series of financial reforms in 1990s, the 
domestic lending market has gotten stagnant because of the high NPL ratios of the four largest 
commercial banks that have approximately a 70 percent share of domestic lending market. As 
indicated in Table 3, average debt to equity ratio of the Chinese firms is quite low compared to 
those in the industrialized countries. With reference to this second hypothesis, this paper also 
examines the hypothesis that an IPO in the B-share market enable the firm to enhance 
bargaining power with banks with respect to the determination of borrowing interest rates2. 
────────────
  2 This derivative hypothesis is based on Rajan (1992). Rajan (1992) notes, firms that have high dependency on
single bank borrowing must pay rent to the bank in the form of an additional lending interest rate. However, a firm 
─ 26 ─ 
Table 1 Overview of the Equity Markets in China 
A-share B-share A-share B-share H-share Red Chip
(a)Market
Participants
Domestic
Investors
Foreign
Investors
Domestic
Investors
Foreign
Investors
Hong Konger,
Foreign
Investors
Hong Konger,
Foreign
Investors
(b)Establishment November, 1990 February, 1992 August, 1991 February, 1992 July, 1993 July, 1993
(c)Transaction
Currency
Chinese Yuan US Dollar Chinese Yuan Hong KongDollar
Hong Kong
Dollar
Hong Kong
Dollar
Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange Hong Kong Stock Exchange
 
Source：Author made based on The China Stock Market Web. 
 
Table 2 The Number of Listed Firms and Annual Average of Market Capitalization in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange 
Shanghai A Shenzhen A Shanghai B Shenzhen B
1995 Number of Listed Firms 184 127 36 34
Market Capitalization 47,990 11,342 1,333 750
2000 Number of Listed Firms 559 499 55 58
Market Capitalization 260,880 221,716 2,611 2,651
2005 Number of Listed Firms 824 531 54 55
Market Capitalization 283,223 110,960 2,975 4,705
A-share Market B-share Market
 
Source: CEIC Database 
Note: Firms, Million USD 
 
  The third hypothesis concerns the firm’s growth opportunity and financial distress. 
Originated from Rajan and Zingales (1995), firms with promising investment opportunities 
prefer equity financing to an additional bank borrowing. In China, this third hypothesis is also 
plausible, because the firms always face serious borrowing constraint as noted the above. 
  The fourth hypothesis of this study is that the size of the firm is positively related to the 
firm’s IPO in the B-share market, but the interpretation of this variable is different from the 
existing literatures. This hypothesis assumes that a large firm has smaller information 
────────────
with diversified financing technique enables itself to minimize this rent because the bargaining power is
strengthened. 
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asymmetry between corporate insiders and foreign participants in the B-share market following 
the prominent existing literatures like Leland and Pyle (1977), Rock (1986), Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1995). However, this paper also regard that firms with larger size enrolled important 
under the State Council’s national development policy, so that, going IPO in the B-share is 
promoted. 
 
3. Empirical Study 
3.1 Data 
  The data used in this study are obtained from The Net China Limited. The empirical 
analyses employed two empirical models and datasets. One dataset consists of all the individual 
A-share firm financial data, excluding finance-related businesses firms. Another dataset consists 
of both A-share and B-share firm data. The latter data includes the issuance of capital stock data 
of the individual firms in addition to the former dataset. Sample period of the former is from 
1994 to 2001. The latter is from 1997 to 2001, due to the data unavailability of the issuance of 
capital stock.  
  Descriptive statistics in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that average of profitability of A-share firms 
is statistically higher than that of the B-share firms in terms of return on assets. The average of 
debt to equity ratio of B-share firms is significantly higher than that of A-share firms since 1995, 
continuously. The ratio of individual firm’s interest payment to total liabilities of B-share firms 
is also averagely higher than that of A-share firms. The MBR (=[market value of capital + book 
value of liability]) / book value of total assets) of A-share firms is also higher than that of B-
share firms. The size of B-share firms are statistically larger than A-share firms in terms of sales 
and total assets.  
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Table 3 Average of Major Financial Indicators of the Sample Firms  
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on financial data of Net China, Inc.  
DER_M: debt to market value of capital, ROA: EBITDA to total assets, ASSET: logarithm of total assets (Mil RMB), 
RCC: relative comparative ratio of interest costs to debt to the sample firm average, MBR: book value of assets less the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by the book value of assets, B_share: Number of B-
share stock issued to total number of outstanding stocks, B_IPO: Number of B share IPO firms 
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Table 4 Result of t-test of Major Financial Indicators of the Chinese Listed Firms  
ROA DER_M DER_B RCC MBR Asset
Number of
A-share
Firms
Number of
B-share
Firms
1994 A>=B ** A<=B *** A<=B *** 143 51
1995 A>=B ** A<B * A<=B *** A<=B *** 233 57
1996 A>=B * A<B *** A<=B ** A>=B *** A<=B *** 376 79
1997 A>=B *** A<=B *** A<=B *** A>=B *** A<=B *** 526 94
1998 A>=B *** A<=B *** A<=B *** A>=B *** A<=B *** 626 92
1999 A>=B *** A<=B *** A<=B *** A>=B *** A<=B *** 719 93
2000 A>=B *** A<=B *** A<=B ** A<=B *** A>=B *** A<=B *** 821 100
2001 A>=B *** A<=B *** A<=B *** A<=B *** 875 99
 
Note 1: ***, **, * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significant level as a result of t-test of difference between 
A-share and B-share firm’s average. These indications are preferentially based on t-statistics of “>” or “<” in case that 
“=” is simultaneously significant.  
Note 2: DER_B: debt to market value of capital 
   
3.2 Empirical Model  
  Using the datasets introduced in the previous section, this paper estimates the following two 
equations to verify the hypotheses. 
   
   ititititiititit vudASSETMBRRCCMDERROAconsty ++++++++= −−−−− 15141131211 _ ααααα   (1. 1) 
   
   itititititititit vudASSETMBRRCCMDERROAconstz ''_ '1514131211 ++++++++= −−−−− φφφφφ   (2. 1) 
   
  yit equals 0 if firm i only stays in the A-share market and equals 1 if it goes IPO in the B-
share market. At any time t, the sample includes all the A-share firms. After a firm went IPO in 
the B-share market, the firm is dropped from the sample. On the other hand, zit is the number of 
B-shares issued as a ratio to total outstanding stock. This sample keeps all the A-share and B-
share firms through the sample period even after an A-share firm went IPO in the B-share 
market.  
  ROA and DER_M are the lagged return on assets and debt to equity ratio, respectively. 
ROA is a proxy variable for internal funds and DER_M is financial leverage. RCC is the relative 
cost of credit, i.e., =(1+rit)/(1+rt) where rit is the credit cost of firm i and rt is the average of the 
sample firms at t. MBR is the sum of market value of capital and book value of liabilities as a 
ratio of the book value of total assets, and is used as a proxy variable for growth opportunity. 
ASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets and is a proxy variable for firm size. Year is a 
calendar year dummy.  
  To estimate equation (1. 1) and (2.1), a random-effects probit model and a random-effects 
tobit models are employed. Assuming a normal distribution, N(0,σv2) , for the random effects vi, 
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we have  
   
                   (1. 2) 
   
where  
   
                     (1. 3) 
   
  where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.  We can approximate the integral with M-
point Gauss-Hermite quadrature 
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  where w*m denotes the quadrature weights and am* denotes the quadrature abscissas. The 
log-likelihood function L, where ρ=σ2v/(σ2v+1), is then calculated using the quadrature 
   
                  (1. 4) 
   
  where wi is a user-specified weight for panel i.  
  A random-effects tobit model of (2. 1) is also estimated assuming normal distribution, 
N(0,σv2) , for the random effects vi, as in the random-effects probit model of (1.1). However, (1. 
3) is replaced by  
   
               (2. 2) 
   
  where C is the set of noncensored observations, L is the set of left-censored observations, 
and R is the set of right-censored observations.  
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3.3 Implications from Empirical Results 
  The first hypothesis concerning the relationship between firm’s profitability and B-share 
IPO is that a firm’s high profitability discourages the intention of going IPO also in the 
segmented B-share market. Empirical results of Table 5 indicate that A-share firms with higher 
profitability is apt to go IPO in the B-share market, while that of Table 6 suggest that the 
number of B-shares issued is negatively influenced by profitability. The difference of these 
results is considered to have originated from the difference in datasets. The dataset of equation 
(1.1) eliminates firms from the sample after the first year of the B-share IPO after the B-share 
IPO, while the dataset of equation (2.1) does not. Therefore, it is inferred, although an IPO of B-
share does not explicitly require high profitability, A-share firms effectively have incentives to 
improve it to be able to go IPO in the B-share market for some reasons which may or may not 
be related to the legal framework. The results of Table 6 support the original hypothesis that a 
firm with ample internal funds is passive to do equity issuance in the B-share market once the 
B-share IPO is achieved.  
  Second, our hypothesis expects a firm’s debt to equity ratio positively related to go IPO in 
the B-share market, but empirical results of Table 5 do not support this. However, in Table 6, the 
coefficient of this variable is significant in case independent variable is the number of B-shares 
issued. In Table 4, t-tests of the average of A-share and B-share firms' debt to equity ratios and 
relative credit cost indicate that B-share firms significantly have higher average of both 
variables. In other words, the B-share firms consequently have stronger external funding 
demand and attain higher ratios of interest payments.  
  Third, a proxy variable for a firm’s growth opportunity has a significant positive 
relationship with both going IPO and the number of shares issued in the B-share market. 
Coupled with the empirical results of the second hypothesis, our conclusion is that a firm with 
high financial leverage and high stock price in the A-share market has an incentive to issue B-
shares as well.  
  Last, with respect to the relationship between firm size and IPO, empirical results support 
our hypothesis. Since Table 4 also indicates that B-share firms statistically have higher average 
firm size in terms of both total assets and sales. Therefore, it is concluded that firm size 
influences B-share IPO in China. However, it must be recognized that, since the larger firm 
generally have diversified businesses, it has better reputation and lower probability of 
bankruptcy. The result contains various interpretations. 
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4. Further Discussion from the Institutional Viewpoint 
  The Chinese Security Law of 1999 that regulates listing rule in the stock market do not 
particularly prescribe quantitative financial conditions, concretely, but emphasizes an 
importance of consistency with the government’s national development policy effectively 
formulated by the State Council. The Securities Regulatory Commission is a regulatory and 
supervisory agency of the Chinese capital market and is concurrently a subordinate organization 
of the State Council. Therefore, the remaining central planned capital market possibly 
influenced profitable large firms to diversify funding instruments under the market-oriented 
reform in the 1990s, institutionally.  
  Our second discussion is regarding the relationship between the stagnant lending market 
and capital market development. Although deregulation on bank loans progressed in recent 
years, there are still many restrictions on lending rates, loan maturities and collaterals in China. 
Coupled with the stagnant domestic lending market caused by extreme high NPL ratios of the 
top four largest commercial banks, these bank regulations are possibly among the factors that 
impose serious financing constraints on Chinese firms. Therefore, both a firm and the 
government are considered to have intensions to mitigate financial constraint by B-share IPO 
under economic reform process and the government especially expected issuers to fulfill various 
financial instruments.  
  Summarizing the above discussions, most of hypotheses based on information economics of 
existing literatures are empirically supported in our study, while the historical institutional 
background in China also facilitated these causalities. In particular, some large B-share firms are 
still regarded as engines to promote the national development policy, therefore, a firm’s decision 
to go B-share IPO is also institutionally influenced by the government. Under the vague written 
requirements of IPO in the B-share market, the first empirical result, i.e., bipolar signs of 
parameters of firm’s profitability suggest that invisible screening of the B-share IPO 
qualification may exist.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper analyzed the determinants of an IPO and the number of issuance in the 
segmented B-share equity market in China. What we should recognize about corporate finance 
in China is that a firm generally has low debt to equity ratio and depends on its internal funds. 
Under this circumstance, the empirical results of this paper suggest that an IPO in the B-share 
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market relax borrowing constraint and strengthen bargaining power with banks. These imply 
that accessibility of the B-share market and the stagnant lending market are the dual issues of 
external funding methods and the Chinese institutional context has reinforced the tendency.  
  Listing in the limited internationalized market improves the firm’s reputation and it 
consequently strengthens relationships with investors. In addition, another implication of our 
empirical study suggested that a firm with large size had smaller information asymmetry 
between insiders and the government agencies and this also spurred a large firm, as an engine of 
the economic development, went IPO in the B-share market. Therefore, an additional of 
financial hierarchy of equity issuance in the segmented stock market that is inferior to the 
normal equity issuance possibly exists under the transition economy like China.  
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